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Fraudulent transfer law is hot. A body of law that originated to prevent
deadbeat debtors from putting their property beyond the reach of creditors1
has, in recent years, been applied to a wide range of modem business
transactions that do not appear to reflect the motivation of the original
fraudulent transfer laws.2 Such extended application has focused interest on
this old body of law, with courts and commentators questioning its proper
scope.'
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author acknowledges with appreciation the
generous research support provided through the Brooklyn Law School Research Stipend Program.
Neal Cohen, Jim Fanto, Clark Remington, and Paul Shupack were kind enough to comment on
an earlier draft of this Article.
1. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent ConveyanceLaw and Its Proper
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829, 852 (1985).
2. See, e.g., BFP v. ResolutionTrust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1765 (1994) (recognizing that
fraudulent transfer law applies to foreclosure sales, although normally, the price received at the
sale is the "reasonably equivalent value"); Clark v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. (In re
Wes Dor, Inc.), 996 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying fraudulent transfer law to an
intercorporate guaranty); Besing v. Hawthorne (In re Besing), 981 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir.) (applying
fraudulent transfer law to a lawsuit termination), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 79 (1993); Moody v.
Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying fraudulent transfer
law to a leveraged buyout); Covey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 960 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1992)
(applying fraudulent transfer law to an intercorporate guaranty); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro
Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying fraudulent transfer law to a
leveraged buyout), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992); Metro Water & Coffee Servs., Inc. v.
Rochester Community Baseball, Inc. (In re Metro Water & Coffee Servs., Inc.), 157 B.R. 742
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying fraudulent transfer law to a contract termination); Christians
v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 148 B.R. 886 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992)
(applying fraudulent transfer law to charitable contributions), aff'd, 152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn.
1993); Murphy v. Mentor Say. Bank (In re O'Day Corp.), 126 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991)
(applying fraudulent transfer law to a leveraged buyout); Darby v. Atkinson (In re Ferris), 415
F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (applying fraudulent transfer law to a lease termination). The
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act immunizes from avoidance under the constructive fraud
provisions "termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant
to the lease and applicable law." UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(e)(1), 7A U.L.A. 662
(1984). Such a termination may, however, be avoided if it was done with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors. See Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent Transfers, 9
CARnozo L. REv. 531, 567-68 (1987).
3. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1; David G. Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law
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In its original form, the fraudulent transfer law proscribed transactions
intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.4 It addressed transactions in
which the debtor, by engaging in a transaction, had a specific intent to prevent
or interfere improperly with collection efforts in order to retain some benefit
for the debtor. Thus, a transaction intended primarily to hide assets from
creditors, or to put assets beyond creditors' reach but within the debtor's
reach, could easily be viewed as one intended to hinder, delay, or defraud.
However, intent to defraud is difficult to prove. Recognizing the
difficulty of proving a transferor's specific intent, courts developed principles
of constructive fraud under which a transaction might be avoidable as
fraudulent even in the absence of a showing of actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud.' The drafters of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act6 and
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act7 included these principles in several
"constructive fraud" provisions, addressing transactions that might be
considered wrongful toward creditors even if it could not be proven that the
debtor had actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud its creditors.'
The constructive fraud provisions generally render avoidable those
transactions in which the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value
for a transfer or obligation and was financially impaired, or rendered
financially impaired, by the transaction. In part, these provisions seem
Efficient?, 9 CARDozo L. REV. 643 (1987); David G. Carlson, Leveraged Btyouts in
Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REv. 73 (1985) [hereinafter Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts]; Robert C.
Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977);
Kennedy, supra note 2; Bruce A. Markell, Toward True and Plain Dealing: A Theory of
Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small Capital, 21 IND. L. REV. 469 (1988); Emily
L. Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against Participants in a Leveraged Buyout, 72 MINN. L. REV.
449 (1988); Jack F. Williams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as
Applied to Intercorporate Guaranties: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy System, 15 CARDozo
L. REV. 1403 (1994) [hereinafter Williams, Fallacies]; Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper
Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8 BANKR. DEv. J. 55 (1991) [hereinafter Williams,
Revisiting].
4. See 13 Eliz., ch. 5, § 1 (1570) (Eng.).
5. See, e.g., Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481 (N.Y. Ch. 1818); Townsend v.
Windham, 28 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch. 1750); Boyd v. Dunlap, 1 Johns. Ch. 478,482 (N.Y. Ch. 1815)
(distinguishingbetween a transfer "fraudulent in fact" and one "only constructively fraudulent").
See generally Kennedy, supra note 2, at 535-36.
6. 7A U.L.A. 427 (1918).
7. 7A U.L.A. 639 (1984).
8. In the Prefatory Note to the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the drafters observed
that in the absence of constructive fraud provisions, courts had been forced to resort to
presumptions of intent to defraud, even in transactions where it was clear that there was no such
intent. See UNIV. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 427, 428 (1918). The
constructive fraud provisions were intended to offer a more direct and intellectually honest means
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intended to identify transactions that might have been driven by fraudulent
intent, even if actual fraudulent intent could not be proven.' In addition,
courts and commentators have suggested that, even in the absence of
fraudulent intent, some transactions may be improper toward creditors. For
example, some have suggested the idea that a debtor should be just before it
is generous."° This ideal of justice before generosity explains the application
of fraudulent transfer law to a wide range of transactions, including gifts by
insolvents and one-shot sales or transfers for clearly inadequate consider-
ation."
However, constructive fraud provisions have been applied to certain
modem transactions that do not fall clearly within either the implied fraud
model or the justice ideal. 2 In this Article, I embark upon the first stage of
9. The Uniform Act provisions are generally consistent with presumptions created by courts
applying the actual fraud standard in the absence of a constructive fraud standard. See, e.g.,
Lobstein v. Lehn, 12 N.E. 68 (Ill. 1887); Worthington v. Bullitt, 6 Md. 172 (1854). One
approach that was superseded by the Uniform Acts, derived from Reade, 3 Johns. Ch. at 481,
and Townsend, 28 Eng. Rep. at 1, considered fraudulent a transfer for inadequate consideration
by a person that was indebted, even if the transferor retained sufficient property to pay its debts,
if subsequently the transferor became unable to pay its debts. See, e.g., Bibb v. Freeman, 59
Ala. 612 (1877); Glasgow v..Turner, 18 S.W. 261 (Tenn. 1892). See also 1 GARRARD GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 266-69 (rev. ed. 1940); James A.
McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 HARv. L. REV. 404
(1933).
10. See, e.g., Reade, 3 Johns. Ch. at 505 (stating that "[a debtor] must be taught ... that the
claims of justice are prior to those of affection"); Clark, supra note 3, at 510-11 (stating that one
of the ideals served by fraudulent transfer law "can be captured by a cliche: be just before you
are generous. The debtor has a moral duty in transferring his property to give primacy to so-
called legal obligations, which are usually the legitimate, conventional claims of standard contract
and tort creditors, as opposed to the interests of self, family, friends, shareholders, and shrewder
or more powerful bargaining parties" (footnotes omitted)).
11. The drafters of the Uniform Acts seem to have adopted this traditional justification,
although they offered little explanation for their adoption of constructive fraud principles. See
UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, §§ 4-6, 7A U.L.A. 474, 504, 507 (1918); UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, §§ 4-5, 7A U.L.A. 652-53, 657 (1984). The Prefatory Note to
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act indicates that the Uniform Act was intended to clarify
the law of fraudulent conveyances as well as to overturn the view in some jurisdictions that a gift
by a debtor was fraudulent as to existing creditors if the debtor thereafter became insolvent.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 427, 428-29 (1918).
12. See cases cited supra note 2. Two applications that have generated particular controversy
are the use of fraudulent transfer law to attack foreclosure sales and leveraged buyouts. Prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994),
holding that the price obtained at a properly conducted foreclosure sale is the reasonably
equivalent value, id. at 1765, some courts had held that a properly conducted foreclosure sale
could be attacked as a fraudulent transfer if the price obtained at the sale was less than a
judicially determined fair market value of the property. See, e.g., Walker v. Littleton (In re
Littleton), 888 F.2d 90 (11th Cir. 1989); Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815 (7th
Cir. 1988); Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). Commentators
1995] 1167
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an exploration of the purpose of fraudulent transfer law and, in particular, the
purpose of the constructive fraud tests, by considering the role of fraudulent
transfer law in regulating the level of risk taken by debtors. I suggest that
fraudulent transfer law addresses a range of transactions that, although not
engaged in with any malevolent intent, necessarily have the effect of
improperly or unfairly interfering with creditors' abilities to collect on their
claims by unreasonably increasing the risk faced by creditors. By monitoring
the level of risk undertaken by debtors, application of the constructive fraud
provisions to modem transactions may serve an important purpose not
explicitly contemplated when these provisions were initially promulgated.
In Part I of this Article, I describe the general principles of fraudulent
transfer law. In Part II, I consider the role of fraudulent transfer law in
monitoring risks taken by debtors. In Part III, I consider two increasingly
common types of business transactions, leveraged buyouts and intercorporate
guarantees, and discuss the use of fraudulent transfer law to regulate the risks
imposed on creditors. I analyze the application of the constructive fraud tests
as illustrative of the policy of permitting debtors to take risks, but not
unreasonable risks, at the expense of their creditors. Finally, I explain in Part
IV that although the recognition of fraudulent transfer law as a means of
monitoring risks taken by debtors can assist in analyzing particular cases,
many questions remain to be analyzed. The questions include whether
fraudulent transfer law is the optimal vehicle for monitoring these transactions,
whether the concept of value in the fraudulent transfer law and the standards
of constructive fraud provide adequate measures of risks, and whether
remedies provided by fraudulent transfer law are appropriate in the context of
these transactions.
PART I
OVERVIEW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW
Fraudulent transfer law developed under the common law and was
codified in the Statute of Elizabeth.' 3 The Statute of Elizabeth provided for
disagreed vigorously about whether this was a proper use of fraudulent transfer law. Compare
Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. Rv. 725, 777-86 (1984)
(arguing that foreclosure sales should be analyzed under preference law instead of fraudulent
conveyance law) and Robert M. Zinman et al., Fraudulent TransfersAccording to Alden, Gross,
& Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAW. 977 (1984) (arguing that Durrett
misinterpreted the law of fraudulent transfer) with Kennedy, supra note 2, at 535 (arguing that
applying fraudulent transfer law to foreclosure sales is "wholly consonant with the course of
development of creditors' remedies against injurious transfers of their debtors' assets"). BFP
resolved this dispute in favor of accepting the price obtained at a properly conducted sale. The
application of fraudulent transfer law to leveraged buyouts is discussed infra in Part III.
13. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571) (Eng.). See also GLENN, supra note 9, §§ 58-62.
1168 [Vol. 46:1165
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the avoidance and punishment of transfers made "to the end, purpo[s]e and
intent, to delay, hinder or defraud creditors. "" This early fraudulent transfer
statute was apparently in part a criminal law, in part a revenue measure (the
Crown could receive a portion of any recovery), and only in part a creditor
protection.'5  However, when the English courts held that a judgment
creditor could disregard a fraudulent conveyance and levy execution on the
property transferred, the fraudulent conveyance law became primarily one of
creditor protection. 6
Twyne's Case 1 is considered the seminal fraudulent transfer case
describing standards for applying the Statute of Elizabeth. It also represents
a typical fact situation to which the law would apply. In Twyne's Case, the
debtor, Pierce, owed C. two hundred pounds and owed Twyne four hundred
pounds. Pierce secretly transferred his property to Twyne but retained use and
possession of the property. Indeed, Pierce subsequently sold some of the
sheep involved, sheared and marked others, and generally treated the property
transferred as if it still belonged to him. C. sent the sheriff to levy on what
he thought was Pierce's property, but friends of Twyne prevented the sheriff
from doing so, pointing out that the property no longer belonged to Pierce.
The court held that the transfer was fraudulent and void (or, more likely,
voidable) as against Pierce's creditors.'" The court pointed out six aspects
of the transaction that indicated Pierce's fraudulent intent: (1) The gift was
general; Pierce transferred even his necessities; (2) Pierce retained possession
of the property and used it as his own; (3) the transaction was secret; (4) it
was made pending C.'s writ; (5) there was a trust between the parties; and (6)
the deed explicitly recited that the transfer was made "honestly, truly, and
bona fide."19 These factors came to be known as badges of fraud, which
could be used to identify transactions engaged in with intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors.
The focus of Twyne's Case and of fraudulent transfer jurisprudence at that
time seems to have been debtors' bad conduct intended to protect their
interests in property at the expense of their creditors. Thus, the problem in
Twyne's Case was not simply that the debtor had transferred property or that
the debtor had preferred one creditor, Pierce, over another, C. Rather, the
problem was that the debtor actively hid the transfer from his creditors and,
in addition, seemed to set up the transaction so that the debtor could retain the
14. 13 Eliz., ch. 5, § 1 (1571) (Eng.).
15. GLENN, supra note 9, § 61a-c.
16. Id. § 61d.
17. 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
18. Id. at 812.
19. Id. at 812-14.
1995] 1169
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benefit of the property and, eventually, probably recover the property from the
transferee. 2
It is reasonable to ask why, in addition to protecting the Crown's rights
to property, the law would develop to protect third parties' debt collection
rights. After all, creditors who did not want their debtors putting property
beyond their reach could have proscribed such behavior in their agreements.
However, merely proscribing wrongful behavior in a credit agreement would
not assure creditors a remedy if the debtor violated the agreement. Moreover,
as the court in Twyne's Case acknowledged, the range of potential debtor
misconduct is virtually limitless. Creditors unable to predict the latest scheme
would fall prey to their debtors' misconduct.
Fraudulent transfer law appears to have developed to imply a term in all
credit arrangements barring the debtor from defrauding its creditors. Such an
implied term is consistent with other implied contractual provisions, such as
those proscribing unconscionability or requiring good faith. 2' The fraudulent
transfer law also appears to have been intended to provide a viable remedy for
violation of the implied term. An action against a judgment-proof debtor like
Pierce would not suffice. Fraudulent transfer law addressed the issue by
recognizing an action against the transferee to recover the property improperly
transferred.
But what does it mean to intend to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors?
Surely, if Pierce had used his creditors' money to buy sheep that later died
from an unexpected disease, the purchase of the sheep would not be consid-
ered fraudulent notwithstanding that their death may have prevented creditors
from collecting on their claims. Similarly, if Pierce had invested the money
in seeds that failed to sprout and grow because of a drought or in a roadside
stand that failed to prosper for lack of customers, it seems unlikely that the
court would have labeled those transactions fraudulent, notwithstanding that
they might have adversely affected creditors' rights. The problem with
Pierce's transaction in Twyne's Case was that it was not a normal, reasonably
expectable business investment, nor was it above board. Instead, it was an
unusual, suspicious transaction that directly impeded other creditors in their
attempts to obtain satisfaction of their claims.
The badges of fraud listed in Twyne's Case, along with other badges that
have developed over the years, assisted courts in determining whether a
20. According to Professor Glenn, this was analogous to the fairly typical pattern of debtors
putting their assets beyond the reach of their creditors prior to embarking overseas or otherwise
engaging in conduct or transactions that might lead to loss of their property. GLENN, supra note
9, § 61. The fraudulent transfer law may have been originally intended to protect the Crown's
right to that property, but it evolved into protection for creditors as well.
21. See U.C.C. §§2-302; 1-203.
1170 [Vol. 46:1165
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transfer or obligation involved the type of unusual, suspicious, injurious
transaction that could be considered to be based on actual fraudulent intent.
However, they could not entirely cure the problem that intent, particularly the
type of malevolent intent purposely and actually to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors, is difficult to prove.
In part to address this problem, courts,' and subsequently Uniform
Acts,' developed principles of constructive fraud that rendered avoidable
transactions for which actual fraud might not be proven but that were likely
to have involved improper intent.24 Implicit in these constructive fraud
principles is the recognition of a broader view of intent that may have
motivated the court's analysis in Twyne's Case. This view encompasses acts
that by their nature will improperly and unreasonably harm creditors even if
the debtor did not have clear malevolent intent to cause harm.2
5
Although the exact technical content of the constructive fraud provisions
has varied as fraudulent transfer law has developed, the basic principles have
not changed significantly. The constructive fraud provisions address
transactions under which the transferor or obligor did not receive reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for a transfer or the incurring of an obligation at
a time when, or after which, the transferor or obligor was insolvent, had
unreasonably small capital or assets to continue in its business, or intended or
believed that it would incur debts beyond its ability to pay as the debts became
due.26 The essence of these provisions is a depletion of the debtor's estate
at a time when the debtor is seriously financially impaired, or which renders
the debtor seriously financially impaired.
22. See supra note 5.
23. See supra notes 6-7.
24. These constructive fraud provisions were later incorporated into the bankruptcy law. See
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67(e), 30 Stat. 544, 564 (repealed 1978); Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 548, 92 Stat. 2549, 2600-01 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C.A. § 548 (1993) & Supp. 1995).
25. Cases have held that a debtor should be viewed as having intended the natural
consequences of its acts. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288,
1305 (3d Cir. 1986) citing In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. IIl. 1964),
rev'd, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Vir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967)), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1005 (1987).
26. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, §§ 4-6, 7A U.L.A. 474,504, 507 (1918); UNIF.
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PART II
REGULATION OF RISK
In general, the constructive fraud provisions are intended to address
transfers that, although perhaps not made with any malevolent intent,
necessarily have the effect of improperly and adversely affecting creditors.
For example, gifts by insolvents, even if done without any fraudulent intent,
are objectionable because they can only harm creditors by reducing the already
insufficient property available.27 Similarly, other transactions by financially
impaired debtors who receive less than reasonably equivalent value may
unfairly or improperly harm creditors even when the debtor did not have any
intention to cause harm to its creditors.28
Commentators have generally recognized that fraudulent transfer law
addresses transactions that unfairly or improperly harm creditors in addition
to those that are actually intended to harm creditors. 29  However, most
commentators fail to define adequately the concept of unfair or improper
harm. Instead, they tend to engage in circular reasoning by asserting that a
transaction is improper or unfair if it fails a constructive fraud test and that,
therefore, the constructive fraud tests describe unfair or improper transactions.
They do not generally identify what the impropriety or unfairness is or why
the constructive fraud tests might represent a reasonable approximation of
those transactions that are unfair or improper toward creditors."
27. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 832.
28. In this regard, a fair question is what exactly is meant by intent. Must the debtor have
actual intent to cause harm to its creditors, or is it sufficient if the debtor knows or should know
that the necessary result of its actions will be to cause harm? For example, a financially impaired
debtor giving a gift may do so out of mere generosity or charitable instinct, see Christians vs.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 148 B.R. 886 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992) (applying
the law of fraudulent transfer to charitable contributions), aff'd, 152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993),
for silly reasons, or for no reason. Yet, knowing that the gift will cause a loss that will
eventually fall on its creditors, is there intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors? In an
analogous line of cases, some courts construing the "willful and malicious" standard of
Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6), 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988), have in recent years interpreted it
as requiring an intentional act, the necessary result of which will be harm, regardless of whether
the debtor actually intended to cause harm. See, e.g., Impulsora Del Territorio Sur, S.A. v.
Cecchini (In re Cecchini), 780 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986).
29. See, e.g., Glenn, supra note 9, § 275 (stating that "the test is whether, as a result of the
transaction, the debtor's estate was unfairly diminished" (emphasis added)); Kennedy, supra note
2, at 562 (stating that "fraudulent transfer law ... condemns injurious transfers out of debtors'
estates"); Williams, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 59 (stating that "most commentators agree that
the thrust of fraudulent transfer law is to protect [against] the unjust diminution of the debtor's
estate").
30. One notable exception to this statement is Clark, supra note 3, at 506-17 (suggesting
several principles underlying fraudulent transfer law).
1172 [Vol. 46:1165
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 6 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss6/3
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
What does it mean, then, to characterize a transaction as improperly or
unfairly interfering with creditors? I suspect that there is a range of improper
and unfair interferences. The mere diminution (at least unjustified) of the
debtor's estate when the debtor is financially impaired, depriving creditors of
the ability to collect on their claims, suggests impropriety or, at least,
unfairness, at least when there is no justification for the diminution. This is
the traditional type of transaction from which the constructive fraud principles
have been derived. 3' The improper or unfair interference results simply
because a financially impaired debtor transfers property in a manner that
reduces the property available to creditors. The transactions to which this
paradigm has been applied typically have been one-shot deals in which the
debtor transferred some property and received inadequate consideration in
return.
The traditional cases did not consider some of the situations that arise in
modem cases, where the transfer or obligation is part of a larger investment
transaction. These involve not merely transfers of property, but the undertak-
ing of business risks that, in some cases, may not be entirely unusual or
improper.
Professor McCoid gave the example several years ago of the debtor who,
"while hoping to pay his creditors, is 'gambling with their money.'"32 The
debtor might, for example, "sell at a low price to get desperately needed
liquidity. " 3  Professor McCoid concluded that "if gambling with another's
money is wrong, then it would be logical to outlaw credit transactions."" 4
Similarly, Professors Baird and Jackson correctly point out that creditors lend
money to debtors to take advantage of debtors' "entrepreneurial skills," which
requires that debtors have some freedom to take risks with their creditors'
funds.35 Creditors expect their debtors to take risks and should not be heard
to complain when risks are taken.
Thus, fraudulent transfer law does not bar debtors from taking risks with
their creditors' funds. It does, however, regulate the permissible degree of
risk. Under this view, the improper and unfair interference with creditors'
31. Professors Baird and Jackson observed the following in 1985:
Much of the case law under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and federal
bankruptcy law has concerned individual rather than corporate debtors and most of
the transfers attacked as fraudulent conveyances have been between relatives, friends,
or other insiders.. . . For this reason, the reach of fraudulent conveyance law has
not been an issue for much of this century.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 832.
32. John C. McCoid II, Constructively Fraudulent Conveyances: Transfers for Inadequate
Consideration, 62 TEX. L. REv. 639, 657 (1983).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 834.
1995] 1173
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rights that is addressed by fraudulent transfer law occurs when a debtor takes
not merely risks, but unreasonable risks, with assets that would otherwise be
available to satisfy creditors' claims.36
This approach assures that analysis of a transaction through the prism of
fraudulent transfer law need not lead necessarily to avoidance of a transaction.
A court may find that a risky transaction ultimately depriving creditors of
satisfaction of their claims was not unreasonably risky when it occurred. If
the constructive fraud tests adequately reflect the policy of addressing only
unreasonable risk, then a transaction that is not unreasonably risky would not
be avoidable under fraudulent transfer law.
By addressing unreasonable risks, fraudulent transfer law can be viewed
as providing credit transactions and agreements with an off-the-rack term
requiring the debtor to limit itself to reasonable business or financial risks.
This limitation is very likely consistent with the terms that creditors and a
debtor would negotiate were they sufficiently prescient and sophisticated to do
so. 37 In effect, then, fraudulent transfer law defines not only those transac-
tions that are likely to involve fraudulent intent or that under any conceivable
set of facts will injure creditors, but also those transactions that represent
unreasonable risks beyond the level that creditors can be presumed to have
accepted.
This implied term represents an important creditor protection. When
creditors extend credit to debtors, they expect the debtors to take risks with
their money. To the extent that the parties can predict the types of risks that
might be taken, the parties may limit the debtor's ability to take risks through
36. Finance economists have identified two types of investment risk. First, the expected
return of a transaction, calculated as "the arithmetic mean of the possible outcomes of an
investment with each such outcome being weighted by the probability of its occurrence," may be
less than the cost of the investment. V. Brudney and W. Bratton, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATE FINANCE 57 (4th ed. 1993). Second, the relative dispersion of the probability
distribution associated with each outcome may be too great. In evaluating the riskiness of a
transaction, it will be necessary to consider both the expected return and the dispersion of
possible outcomes. Id. at 57-64. An analysis of the effect of each type of risk on the
reasonableness of a transaction is beyond the scope of this article. It is, however, obviously of
great importance ultimately in determining how fraudulent transfer law should evaluate the
question of unreasonable risk.
37. If fraudulent transfer law is viewed as providing an implied contractual term prohibiting
debtors from taking unreasonable risks, the question arises whether creditors can waive that term.
The answer is not entirely clear. It would seem that by agreeing that a debtor may engage in
transactions otherwise prohibited by fraudulent transfer law, or in a particular transaction that
might be prohibited, a creditor may be able to waive effectively its right to object subsequently
to the transaction. Such a waiver would not, of course, bind other creditors, and a debtor should
not be able to impose a waiver on creditors. Moreover, a waiver will not necessarily prevent a
creditor from benefiting from avoidance in a bankruptcy proceeding. That, however, is a
function of federal bankruptcy law, not fraudulent transfer law. See Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4
(1931); see also 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
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the use of covenants in a loan agreement. In some cases, however, such
limitations may be commercially or practically unrealistic." Moreover, the
parties probably cannot predict all possible risks that a debtor might take with
a creditor's funds. As.the court observed in Twyne's Case, the range of
potential fraud, or unreasonable risks, is enormous and unpredictable.
Additionally, a term implied through fraudulent transfer law yields
remedies that would be unavailable in a debtor-creditor agreement. A debtor-
creditor agreement would enable creditors to declare a default and enforce
their remedies against the debtor if the debtor violated the agreement.
However, if the debtor transferred property to a good faith purchaser,
unsecured creditors could not recover it merely because the credit agreement
was violated.39  The agreement risks creating a wrong without a remedy.
Fraudulent transfer law seeks to identify the wrong and to provide a
meaningful remedy.4"
Thus, just as the law has evolved to protect creditors against a debtor's
intentional fraud and misbehavior, and in many cases, to imply a good faith
requirement, particularly in many commercial dealings,4 1 fraudulent transfer
38. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1297 n.2 (3d Cir.
1986) (noting that involuntary creditors, and creditors who extended credit before the type of
transaction at issue became common, probably cannot contractually protect themselves, cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); see also Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and
Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1491 (1987) (arguing that powerful creditors who could
restrict the debtor's ability to engage in an L1O are more likely to take a security interest in the
debtors assets and that smaller trade creditors are unlikely to have sufficient leverage to restrict
the debtor's behavior).
39. Recovery would normally be available if creditors had perfected security interests in the
property. See, e.g. U.C.C. §§ 9-201 (1990). Absent, a security interest, there would be little
protection for a creditor against transfers by the debtor. Even a creditor with a security interest
in the debtor's property might be injured by the debtor's incurring of additional debt, which
might make it more difficult for the debtor to pay its obligations. Although an agreement might
contain negative covenants prohibiting additional debt, violation of such covenants would not
normally represent a ground for avoiding the new debt.
40. The remedy provided by fraudulent transfer law, however, is not necessarily the ideal
remedy. There has been considerable disagreement about the proper reach of fraudulent transfer
remedies. See, e.g., Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts, supra note 3; Robert J. White, Leveraged
Buyouts and Fraudulent Conveyance Laws Under the Bankruptcy Code-Like Oil and Water,
They Just Don't Mix, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357 (1991).
One of the most troubling remedy issues is the degree to which recovery should be available
from a good faith transferee who gave value for the transfer. For example, suppose that a debtor
makes an investment with an expected return equivalent to the cost of the investment but with a
wide dispersion of possible outcomes. The investment might be viewed as unreasonably risky
notwithstanding an equivalent expected return. Should the transferee be subject to a fraudulent
transfer action because the risk was unreasonable vis a vis the particular debtor involved?
41. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-103(1)(b), 3-103(a)(4), 1 U.L.A. 109, 185, 2 U.L.A. 22
(1990); See also U.C.C. § 2-302, 1A U.L.A. 15-16 (dealing with unconscionability). See
generally Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance
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law may be viewed as implying a requirement that a debtor taking risks with
its creditor's funds limit itself to reasonable risks.42 It may also provide the
meaningful remedy that would otherwise be unavailable to the injured parties.
The constructive fraud standards attempt to describe these unreasonably
risky transactions. Notice what transactions are included in the constructive
fraud provisions: transfers for which the debtor fails to receive reasonably
equivalent value and after which the debtor (1) is insolvent; (2) is left with
unreasonably small assets to continue its business; or (3) intends or expects to
incur debts beyond its ability to pay as the debts become due. A transaction
fitting any of these tests is not simply risky, it is unreasonably risky because
there is a high probability that the transaction will inhibit the debtor's ability
to pay its creditors. These are transactions that are unreasonably detrimental
to creditors because they create an unreasonably high degree of risk.
The unreasonable risk flows from the substantial impairment of the
debtor's ability to service its debt after the transaction. If a debtor has failed
to receive reasonably equivalent value in a transaction, then the value of the
remaining property available to creditors is reduced. This means that there is
a greater risk that creditors' claims will not be satisfied.43 If in addition the
debtor is financially impaired when it engages in the transaction that reduces
available property (or is rendered financially impaired by the transaction), then
the risk that the debtor's finances will be unable to turn around is further
increased. The constructive fraud provisions suggest that when a debtor puts
at unreasonable risk the property needed to satisfy its creditors, the transaction
in which it does so may be avoided by the adversely affected creditors.
and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 335, 341 (1988) (proposing a
.conceptual reconstruction" of the good faith principle as applied in Article Nine of the Uniform
Commercial Code); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) (providing a general discussion of the good
faith requirement as described in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
42. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AcT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1918); UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 652 (1984).
43. It should be noted that if fraudulent transfer law is to serve effectively as a check on
unreasonable risk, then the concept of value may need to be viewed in a manner different from
the conventional understanding. For example, suppose that an insolvent debtor has the
opportunity to purchase for $100 a lottery ticket giving it a one in a million chance of receiving
$100 million. The expected return of the "investment" is $100, the amount paid for the
opportunity. Yet a transaction with such a high probability of failure probably represents an
unreasonable risk for an insolvent debtor. Although beyond the scope of this essay, further
examination of the measure of risk and the concept of value in fraudulent transfer law is
necessary. It may be that risk and value should be measured from the creditors' perspective, see,
e.g. American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783 (1929), or, perhaps, that value
for fraudulent transfer purposes might be measured as the utility of an investment rather than
simply the expected return. See Brudney & Bratton, supra note 36, at 57-64.
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Viewed in this light, it is possible to reconcile the application of fraudulent
transfer law to a wide range of corporate as well as individual transactions.
Evaluation of the utility of the constructive fraud standards as regulators
of unreasonable risk can be based on the application of those standards to
modem transactions. In Part III of this Article, I examine the application of
the constructive fraud standards to two modem types of transactions. This
examination illustrates the use of fraudulent transfer law as a regulator of risk
taking by debtors.
PART III
APPLICATION OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD STANDARDS
In general, the actual fraud standard in fraudulent transfer law has served
a useful and uncontroversial purpose. It authorizes the avoidance of
transactions that were specifically intended to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors and restores to the extent possible the status quo that existed prior to
the transaction. By focusing on the debtor-transferor's intent, the actual fraud
standard addresses the malevolent behavior that unfairly places beyond the
reach of creditors property that should be available to satisfy their claims.'
As they were originally applied, the constructive fraud standards also
were relatively uncontroversial. They typically were used to permit the
avoidance of fairly straightforward transactions in which debtors engaged in
behavior that appeared clearly to be objectionable from the perspective of the
creditor body.
In recent years, however, these provisions have been applied to types of
transactions that are not as obviously objectionable. For example, fraudulent
transfer law has been used to evaluate such increasingly common business
transactions as leveraged buyouts and corporate guarantees.45 It has also
been applied to otier common business tansactions that are not genrrically objectionable."
.44. One interesting question that remains is why fraudulent transfer law places the interests
of the transferor's creditors over the interests of an innocent transferee. Avoidance of a
fraudulent transfer may in some cases deprive the transferee of its expectation even if the
transferee was not a party to the fraud. See UFCA § 9 UFTA §§ 7, 8.
45. See, e.g., Clark v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. (In re Wes Dor, Inc.), 996 F.2d
237 (10th Cir. 1993) (evaluating an intercorporate guaranty); Moody v. Security Pac. Business
Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1992) (evaluating a leveraged buyout); Covey v.
Commercial Nat'l Bank, 960 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1992) (evaluating an intercorporate guaranty);
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991) (evaluating
a leveraged buyout), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992); Murphy v. Mentor Say. Bank (In re
O'Day Corp.), 126 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (evaluating a leveraged buyout).
46. See, e.g., BFP v. ResolutionTrust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1765 (1994) (recognizingthat
fraudulent transfer law applies to foreclosure sales, although normally the price received at the
sale is reasonably equivalent value and sale is not, therefore, avoidable as fraudulent transfer);
Besing v. Hawthorne (In re Besing), 981 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir.) (evaluating a lawsuit termination),
1995] 1177
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Many transactions that have been examined through the lens of fraudulent
transfer law have not involved actual fraudulent intent nor were they, by their
generic nature, necessarily doomed to fail and consequently to harm creditors.
Some of these transactions may have been so unobjectionable in theory that,
if asked in advance if a debtor should be permitted to engage in the type of
transaction at issue, creditors might have been expected to say yes.
In some cases, however, the financial condition of the debtor may have
made these transactions not merely risky, but so unreasonably risky as to
become objectionable even to creditors who recognize that their debtor will
take risks with their funds. A review of the application of fraudulent transfer
law to leveraged buyouts and intercorporate guarantees illustrates how it can
be applied to transactions in a manner that permits risky transactions to
proceed without objection, but also protects creditors against truly unreason-
able risks.
a. Leveraged Buyouts
One of the most controversial extensions of fraudulent transfer law
beyond actually fraudulent transactions involves leveraged buyouts (LBOs).
In an LBO, a target company's stock is purchased and paid for by a third-party
acquiror, primarily using financing secured by the assets of the target. The
transaction can be structured in one of several general forms with myriad
variations.
Under one structure the target borrows money, typically secured by its
assets, uses the funds to buy its stock from its old shareholders (or makes
available to the acquiror the funds necessary to acquire the stock), and then
transfers the stock or issues new stock to the acquiror.47 Another structure
has the acquiror borrow money, guaranteed or ultimately assumed by the
target and secured by the target's assets, and use the money to purchase the
target's stock from the old shareholders. 4 A variety of other structures have
been used as well.
49
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 79 (1993); Metro Water & Coffee Servs., Inc. v. Rochester Community
Baseball, Inc. (In re Metro Water & Coffee Servs., Inc.), 157 B.R. 742 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1993) (evaluating a contract termination); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re
Young), 148 B.R. 886 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992) (evaluating charitable contributions), aff'd, 152
B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993); Darby v. Atkinson (In re Ferris), 415 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla.
1976) (evaluating a lease termination).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1292-93 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais
Lumber Supply, Inc.), 100 B.R. 127, 130 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
48. See, e.g., Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1988); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v.
Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488,494-95 (N.D. III. 1988), appeal certified, No. 87-C-8111, 1989 WL
51068 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 1989).
49. See, e.g., Moody, 971 F.2d at 1058-62 (applying fraudulent transfer law where the aquiror
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The common theme in these transactions is that the old shareholders are
cashed out, the new shareholders put up little of their own funds, and the
target's assets secure the claims of the lenders who supplied the funds for the
purchase.5 0 By securing with its assets the LBO debt and using the proceeds
primarily to cash out the old shareholders, the target reduces the unsecured
creditors, who previously were senior to the shareholders, to a position that
is junior to the financier of the transaction and, in effect, to the old sharehold-
ers who have been satisfied ahead of the creditors. The priority positions of
the old shareholders and the creditors thus are reversed.
An LBO offers several potential benefits for parties to the transaction. It
enables the old shareholders to cash out their interests and, perhaps, invest
their money elsewhere. Sometimes this cashing out of shareholders is part of
a necessary or desirable restructuring of ownership.5' In addition, a
successful transaction may generate substantial profits for the target's new
owners. Moreover, the LBO may have the effect of strengthening the target
by forcing it to operate more efficiently and effectively. Therefore, if the
LBO works as planned, the LBO may not adversely affect creditors and others
who deal with the target because they may eventually face a stronger debtor
or customer.
However, a transaction involving substantial leverage is inherently risky.
High leverage ratios increase the possibility of business failure. 2 If the
borrowed funds to acquire stock and where, subsequently, the target borrowed funds and used
the funds to repay the acquiror's debt); Mellon, 945 F.2d at 637-40 (applying fraudulent transfer
law where the acquiror borrowed money for acquisition with a loan guaranteed by the target, the
target borrowed working capital with a loan guaranteed by the acquiror, and related corporations
guaranteed repayment of both loans). See generally Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts, supra note 3,
at 80-83 (describing six different ways of structuring leveraged buyouts).
50. As one court described it:
The effect of an LBO is that a corporation's shareholders are replaced by secured
creditors. Put simply, stockholders' equity is supplanted by corporate debt. The
level of risk facing the newly structured corporation rises significantly due to the
increased debt to equity ratio. This added risk is borne primarily by the unsecured
creditors, those who will most likely not be paid in the event of bankruptcy.
Mellon Bank, 945 F.2d at 645-46.
In some cases, a portion of the financing may be provided on an unsecured basis. Although
the unsecured LBO debt would not take priority over other unsecured creditors of the target, the
position of non-LBO creditors is diluted by the addition of substantial debt. See, e.g., In re
Revco D.S., Inc., 118 B.R. 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
51. See, e.g., Kupetz, 845 F.2d at 843-44 (describing an LBO that provided a means of
buying out the interest of a shareholder who was seeking to retire); Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.,
100 B.R. at 129-30 (describing an LBO that enabled one partner to buy out the others where
there was a falling out between partners). Some commentators have suggested that an LBO may
provide shareholders with a "remedy for past suboptimal reinvestment of earnings by entrenched
managers. See, e.g., V. Brudney and W. Bratton, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE
FINANCE 57-64 (4th ed. 1993).
52. See, e.g., Mellon Bank, 945 F.2d at 645-46 (describing the added risk imposed by a
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business does fail, the non-LBO creditors, some of whom may have unsecured
claims against the target predating the LBO, are likely to share the cost of
failure.
Although an LBO imposes risk on creditors, creditors who lend on an
unsecured basis must recognize that the debtor will take risks that may affect
them adversely. One potential risk is that the debtor will use assets otherwise
available to creditors generally to secure new obligations and that the debtor
will more highly leverage itself. This alone is not objectionable; leverage is
not unusual in business and may, under appropriate circumstances, enable a
business to increase its return on equity.53 Thus, some commentators have
concluded that LBOs, which take advantage of high leverage ratios, are simply
not a type of transaction that, absent actual fraud, should be subject to attack
under fraudulent transfer law.
This conclusion, however, flows from a narrow view of fraudulent
transfer law that would limit its scope to transactions involving fraudulent
intent. Under this view, the constructive fraud provisions primarily provide
the evidence of fraudulent intent that was sought under early fraudulent
transfer law. Indeed, when the constructive fraud principles first developed,
a constructively fraudulent transaction probably would have raised a suspicion
of fraudulent intent, or at least would have violated the principle of justice
before generosity.
Adopting an originalist view of fraudulent transfer law, some courts
repeated Professors Baird and Jackson's observation that "[a] firm that incurs
obligations in the course of a buyout does not seem at all like the Elizabethan
deadbeat who sells his sheep to his brother for a pittance." 5 This mantra
suggests that if, notwithstanding the constructive fraud provisions, a transac-
tion appeared to be "'above board,'" fraudulent transfer law was not an
appropriate vehicle for interfering with the transaction.56 Under this
approach if the constructive fraud provisions applied at all, it would be only
when the transaction already appeared suspicious.
This narrow originalist view of fraudulent transfer law also seems to have
been based on an assumption that application of fraudulent transfer law to
LBOs would lead to invalidation of all LBOs.57 Because most LBOs occur
for nonfrauduent business reasons, courts adopting an originalist view resisted
highly leveraged transaction).
53. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 56-58 (1992).
54. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 1.
55. Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 179 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting
Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 852).
56. See Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the idea that these potentially useful transactions could be hindered by the
threat of application of a body of law over 400 years old.58 Thus, under this
originalist view, in the absence of some reason to believe that there was
fraudulent intent, the constructive fraud provisions appear overly broad,
potentially taking in transactions that were not intended to be covered by
fraudulent transfer law. 9
Instead of this narrow view of fraudulent transfer law, limiting its reach
to transactions actually or constructively intended to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors, a broader purpose may be recognized. Fraudulent transfer law may
represent a useful means of distinguishing between those legitimate business
transactions that present reasonable, acceptable risks and those that present an
unreasonable level of risk. When the risk is unreasonable, the transaction is
one that clearly would be unacceptable to an ordinary creditor ab initio. This
is the type of transaction that is objectionable under fraudulent transfer law.
Under this approach, high leverage ratios caused by an LBO would not
render an LBO transaction avoidable per se. However, unreasonably high
leverage is another matter. Unreasonably high leverage shifts virtually all of
the risk of failure to creditors, instead of the sharing of risk between creditors
and equity that exists in more reasonable transactions.' This is the type of
transaction proscribed by the constructive fraud provisions. Thus, fraudulent
transfer law seems to suggest that there is a level of unreasonable risk to
which creditors should not be subjected.
This rationale may not be far from the original purposes of fraudulent
transfer law. Early law proscribed not only transactions intended to defraud,
but those intended to hinder or delay creditors. A transaction with unreason-
ably high leverage, or one that imposes unreasonable risk, may be viewed as
one that was intentionally done and, because of its unreasonable level of risk,
one that hinders, delays, or perhaps, defrauds creditors. Certainly, there is
a level of leverage or risk that virtually assures that creditors will be unlikely
to recover in a timely fashion.
Cases considering the application of fraudulent transfer law to LBOs seem
to have begun to recognize that fraudulent transfer law provides a standard for
distinguishing between transactions that are so risky as to be objectionable
from the perspective of creditors and those that represent reasonable business
risk. The Third Circuit has been particularly active in this regard. In one
58. See id. (stating that "we hesitate to utilize constructive intent to frustrate the purposes
intended to be served by what appears to us to be a legitimate LBO .... We cannot believe that
virtually all LBOs are designed to 'hinder, delay, or defraud creditors").
59. Underlying the move to limit the scope of fraudulent transfer law is the view that mere
risk of fraudulent transfer attack, even if the transaction might on its facts be defended, will
discourage transactions.
60. See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 645-46 (3d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992).
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early case it found that a complex leveraged buyout was actionable under
fraudulent transfer law.6 In two other cases, however, the court determined
that, notwithstanding subsequent business failure, the transactions were not
actionable under fraudulent transfer law.62 In each case, the court's analysis
implicitly recognizes that risk is not objectionable per se, but may be
objectionable if it is unreasonable.
In United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp. 63 a large coal producer was
purchased in a leveraged buyout. The acquiror formed a holding company
that obtained a loan of approximately $8.5 million, most of which was used
to acquire the coal producer. The loan was secured by virtually all of the
target's assets. Unfortunately, the target's financial condition was precarious
before the transaction, and because the acquiror mortgaged the target's assets
with restrictions on their sale and the use of any proceeds, further financing
of the target's operations became even more difficult. Eventually, the lender
foreclosed on the mortgages and sold the properties to a buyer who had
knowledge of the earlier transactions and their problems. 
4
The United States sought to avoid the property transfers, arguing that the
leveraged buyout and the mortgages granted as part of the transaction were
avoidable under fraudulent transfer law. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed and held that the transaction was avoidable.'
The Court of Appeals rejected policy arguments against the application of
fraudulent transfer law to leveraged buyouts, but found that even if fraudulent
transfer law should not apply to some buyout transactions, it would still be
appropriate to apply it to the transaction at issue. The court's following
observation is worth repeating:
In the instant case, . . . the severe economic circumstances in which the
[target] found itself, the obligation, without benefit, incurred by the
[target], and the small number of shareholders benefitted by the transaction
suggest that the transaction was not entered in the ordinary course, that fair
consideration was not exchanged, and that the transaction was anything but
unsuspicious. The policy arguments set forth in opposition to the
application of fraudulent conveyance law to leveraged buy-outs do not
justify the exemption of transactions such as this.
66
61. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, A83 U.S. 1005 (1987).
62. See Moody v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1992); Mellon
Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communication, Inc., 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1476 (1992).
63. 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
64. Tabor, 803 F.2d 1291-94.
65. Id. at 1295-96.
66. Id. at 1297 (footnote omitted).
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The Court of Appeals certainly did not suggest that all leveraged buyouts
would be avoidable as fraudulent transfers. Instead, the Court of Appeals
seemed influenced by the target's impaired financial condition and by the
lower court's finding that the transaction viewed in its entirety was sufficiently
suspicious to suggest intent to defraud.
In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc.,67 a corporate
group involved in broadcasting acquired the stock of Metro, a television and
radio sports syndicator, in a highly leveraged transaction. Mellon Bank
financed the acquisition by lending $1.85 million to the acquiror. Metro and
the members of the corporate group guaranteed the loan. Simultaneously,
Mellon loaned $2.3 million to Metro as working capital under a line of credit.
This loan was guaranteed by the acquiror as well as the other members of the
corporate group. Mellon also financed Metro's purchase of certain broadcast
rights through a letter of credit. Metro was responsible for reimbursing
Mellon for disbursements under the letter of credit.68
All of Metro's obligations to Mellon, including the guaranty obligation for
the acquisition loan, were secured by substantially all of Metro's assets. The
following year, after a creditor levied on some of Metro's accounts in a
dispute over broadcast rights, Metro commenced a bankruptcy case. The
creditors' committee sought to avoid Mellon's liens on Metro's assets as, inter
alia, fraudulent transfers. 9
In analyzing the applicability of fraudulent transfer law to an LBO, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that it might appear anomalous
to apply a law originally aimed at fraudulent transactions to what had become,
in the court's view, "a common, arms-length transaction" in which there
normally is no intentional fraud and in which the lender whose security interest
is being attacked has parted with real value in exchange for the interest.7'
Nevertheless, the court identified in LBOs a potential for abuse, particularly
of unsecured creditors. The court explained that an LBO normally substitutes
a secured creditor for the target corporation's shareholders. From the
perspective of unsecured creditors, the formerly junior interest of shareholders
is replaced by the senior interest of a secured lender. The target's debt to
equity ratio is increased substantially and, with that increase, the unsecured
creditors experience significantly increased risk.71 The Court of Appeals
67. 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992).
68. Id. at 638-39.
69. Id. at 639. In addition to the fraudulent transfer issue; the creditors' committee also
argued that Mellon had perfected its security interest improperly by filing in the wrong
jurisdiction. Id. at 642. see also U.C.C. § 9-103, 3 U.L.A. 142 (1990). The court held that the
security interest was properly perfected. See Mellon, 945 F.2d at 642-44.
70. Mellon, 945 F.2d at 645.
71. Id. at 645-46.
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seemed to view fraudulent transfer law as a means of monitoring the level of
increased risk.
Interestingly, although the Court of Appeals accepted the applicability of
fraudulent transfer law to this type of transaction, it did not find that the
transaction was avoidable as a fraudulent transfer. The Court of Appeals
analyzed the transaction under the two prongs of the constructive fraud test:
(1) reasonably equivalent value and (2) financial impairment.72 It found that
the transaction passed the test.73 The court's analysis of the constructive
fraud provisions reflects an understanding that fraudulent transfer law is aimed
at transactions that create an unreasonable risk to creditors.
By finding the transaction unobjectionable under fraudulent transfer law
even after acknowledging that the LBO increased the risk faced by unsecured
creditors, the court seemed to appreciate that increased risk is permissible as
long as it is not unreasonable. Indeed, the court seemed to recognize the
purpose of the constructive fraud test by analyzing its factors with an
appreciation of the underlying nature of the transaction and the reasonable
expectations of the various parties. 74
For example, in analyzing whether the debtor received reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the security interests that it granted to the
LBO lender, the Court of Appeals recognized that the debtor did not receive
the loan proceeds (which flowed through to the old shareholders) and,
therefore, received no direct benefit. Nevertheless, the court found that value
may be created in forms other than receipt of the loan proceeds. By becoming
part of a corporate group, the debtor could borrow additional working capital
that would not otherwise have been available.75 According to the court, this
increased borrowing ability could constitute value, although the extent of that
value would depend on "the business opportunities the additional credit makes
available to the borrowing corporation and on other imponderables in the
operation or expansion of its business."
76
The court also found value in the synergy created when the debtor joined
the corporate group. According to the court, "The complementary nature of
the two corporations' businesses would appear to create a stronger and more
profitable combination."I
The court's acknowledgement that a debtor may receive substantial value
in exchange for undertaking obligations even when the debtor fails to receive
the proceeds of the loan is of great significance. These indirect forms of value
72. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988).
73. See Mellon, 945 F.2d at 645-50.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 646-47.
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received by the debtor, increased credit availability and corporate group
synergies, can decrease the risk to unsecured creditors initially created by the
transaction. Thus, although the court ultimately failed to ascribe a definite
value to these benefits (because no evidence of value had been presented),78
its analysis represents a recognition that risk does not necessarily increase in
direct proportion to the obligation undertaken by the debtor.
In evaluating the increased risk to creditors, the Court of Appeals also
focused on the liability imposed on the debtor by the transaction. This was
important in evaluating whether the debtor received reasonably equivalent
value and in determining the debtor's solvency after the transaction. The
debtor had guaranteed the acquisition debt incurred by the acquiror, which was
a shell corporation formed to acquire the debtor. In this regard, the guaranty
was not significantly different from a principal obligation because the principal
debtor had no assets with which to pay the debt, and it was clear that the
guarantor would be called upon to pay. Indeed, all of the parties assumed that
the debtor would service the debt.79
However, the debtor was not the only guarantor of the acquisition debt.
The other members of the corporate group also guaranteed the obligation.'
If the debtor were forced to pay the debt, it would be entitled to contribution
from the coguarantors. Therefore, the amount of actual predicted liability
undertaken by the debtor would be less than the face amount of the debt if the
other guarantors were capable of contributing to the satisfaction of the
obligation.
As with the court's analysis of the value received by the debtor, its
analysis of the obligation undertaken by the debtor seemed to evaluate the
actual amount of increased risk created by the transaction. In this regard, the
court recognized that the existence of other parties that might share the
liability reduced the risk imposed on creditors of the debtor.81
Even if the debtor had reduced its available assets by failing to receive
reasonably equivalent value for its secured guaranty obligation, the transaction
would be objectionable under fraudulent transfer law only if the transaction
financially impaired the debtorY If the debtor was not financially impaired
after the transaction, the depletion of assets would not create an unreasonable
risk for creditors. Instead, the absence of financial impairment would assure
sufficient ability to satisfy creditor claims even after the leveraged transaction.
As with its reasonably equivalent value analysis, the Court of Appeals
approached the question of financial impairment from the perspective of the
78. See Mellon, 945 F.2d at 647-48.
79. Id. at 638.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 649.
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988).
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actual risk that the transaction imposed on creditors. It specifically rejected
the lower court's analysis that had found insolvency merely because the debtor
guaranteed the entire acquisition debt on a secured basis.' The lower court
had maintained that because the acquisition price could be assumed to
represent the actual value of the debtor's equity, a pledge of all of the debtor's
assets to secure a debt in that amount plus interest necessarily meant that the
debtor must have been rendered insolvent.'
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the lower court's
approach would amount "to a per se rule that LBO loans collateralized with
the target's assets are fraudulent. "8 The Court of Appeals properly rejected
that analysis, asserting that the actual value of the liability undertaken by the
debtor probably was less than the face amount of the guaranty because the
debtor was entitled to contribution from the other members of the corporate
group. Additionally, the court analyzed the debtor's tax returns and balance
sheets, prepared not long after the transaction, and found reason to believe that
the debtor was solvent after the transaction.86 The court attributed this in
part to the value gained by increased credit availability as well as corporate
group synergies.n Indeed, the court found that the debtor's net worth may
actually have increased after the transaction as a result of these advantages. 88
The court implied from this outcome that the transaction was not unreasonably
risky to unsecured creditors and, in fact, might have been beneficial. It
suggested that the debtor's demise was caused by subsequent unexpected
events, rather by the LBO. 89 Thus, in the court's view, because the LBO did
not cause the failure, no action was available under fraudulent transfer law.
Although the general approach of applying the constructive fraud tests to
evaluate the actual amount of increased risk imposed by a transaction has
merit, the court may have failed to appreciate fully the risk imposed on
creditors of the debtor. For example, the Court of Appeals determined the
debtor's solvency based on the debtor's tax returns and balance sheets. 90
These do not necessarily reflect the actual value of the assets that would be
available to creditors. To the extent that the Court of Appeals was limited by
83. Mellon, 945 F.2d at 648-49.
84. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc. (In re Metro Communication, Inc.),
95 B.R. 921, 934 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989), rev'd, 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992).
85. Mellon, 945 F.2d at 649.
86. See id. at 649-50.
87. Id. at 649 n.4.
88. Id. at 650.
89. Seeld. at 647; see also NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85
(1984) (holding that certain NCAA restrictions on the broadcast of college games violated
antitrust laws, increased competition, and severely decreased revenues from advertising).
90. See Mellon, 945 F.2d at 649-50.
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the creditors' committee's failure to present more compelling evidence of
value, one cannot fault the court for relying on the information before it.
Indeed, the court acknowledged that it could not find that the debtor was
solvent, after the LBO, but only that the committee failed to prove insolven-
cy.9' Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that ultimately the risk
imposed on creditors cannot be determined without realistic appraisal of the
actual effect of the transaction.
Similarly, when the court suggested that the debtor's difficulties may have
been attributable to unforeseen events subsequent to the LBO rather than to the
financial strain of the LBO itself, it may not have given sufficient consider-
ation to the extent to which the LBO might have reduced the debtor's
resistance to financial setbacks. The court noted, "The problem universal to
all LBOs-transactions characterized by their high debt relative to equity
interest-is that they are less able to weather temporary financial storms
because debt demands are less flexible than equity interest."' However, the
question of how much cushion a debtor should have for unforeseen events is
difficult, particularly in analyzing a highly leveraged transaction.
The underlying question is whether a debtor's weakened ability to
"weather temporary financial storms"' is so severe as to present an
unreasonable risk of failure. The appropriate answer requires analysis of
whether the financial reserves projected by the parties appear sufficient, at the
time of the transaction and without knowledge of exactly what future
difficulties will arise, to enable the debtor to deal with at least some unexpect-
ed circumstances. After all, the future always holds some uncertainties, and
a debtor whose financial state is so weakened that it cannot deal with any
unexpected event cannot reasonably expect to succeed in its venture. By
failing to engage in this analysis, the Court of Appeals did not analyze fully
whether the transaction might have imposed on creditors an unreasonable level
of risk.94
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals adopted an approach similar to that
in Mellon when applying the constructive fraud provisions in another LBO
case, Moody v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc.95 Moody did not
involve the purchase of a target for integration into a corporate group; it was
a straight purchase of an enterprise, using the assets of the enterprise to secure
91. See id. at 650.
92. Mellon, 945 F.2d at 647.
93. Id.
94. In evaluating this risk, it is important to remember that if a transactionas all-encompassing
as an LBO fails, creditors' losses will be significant. A failure to reserve sufficiently for
unexpected future events may increase the probability of failure to a level that renders the
transaction unreasonably risky even if the expected value of the transaction, based on large
potential profits if it succeeds, is acceptable.
95. 971 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1992).
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the acquisition debt. After the enterprise failed, the bankruptcy trustee sought
to avoid the lender's liens as fraudulent transfers.96
As in Mellon, the Moody court recognized that fraudulent transfer law
applies to an LBO. 7  However, also as in Mellon, the court refused to
invalidate the transaction under fraudulent transfer law.98
In analyzing the constructive fraud issue, the court explained that the
"constructive fraud provisions furnish a standard of causation that attempts to
link the challenged conveyance with the debtor's bankruptcy. "" Significant-
ly, the Court of Appeals suggested that because an LBO involves high stakes
and the imposition of substantial risk on unsecured creditors, the potential for
abuse might require a level of scrutiny similar to that imposed on intrafamily
transactions."° In effect, the Court of Appeals seemed willing to treat the
leveraged buyout as a badge of fraud, subjecting the transaction to increased
scrutiny. Nevertheless, even under this more rigorous scrutiny the court found
that the transaction was not avoidable under fraudulent transfer law. It found
that even if the debtor-target failed to receive reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the grant of security interests to the LBO lender, the debtor was
solvent and had reasonable capital after the transaction. Therefore, the
transaction was not constructively fraudulent.' 0'
The Court of Appeals applied the constructive fraud standards in a manner
that evaluated the actual risk imposed on creditors. For example, in analyzing
the debtor's solvency, the court found that assets could be valued on a higher
going-concern basis, rather than on a liquidation basis, because the business
was clearly operational after the transaction. The court distinguished this from
a debtor for which bankruptcy is "'clearly imminent'", for which a
liquidation valuation might be more appropriate. ta Implicit in this analysis
is the idea that valuation of the debtor should reflect the reality faced by
creditors immediately after the transaction. This reflects the court's sensitivity
to the concept that fraudulent transfer law seeks to evaluate the actual risk
imposed on creditors by the transaction.0 3
96. See id. at 1059-62.
97. Id. 1064& n.10 (citing Mellon, 945 F.2d at 635; United States v. Tabor Court Realty
Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987)) (citations omitted).
98. See Moody 971 F.2d at 1076.
99. Id. at 1064.
100. Id. at 1065.
101. See id. at 1076. The lower court had found that the LBO was without fair consideration
to the debtor because the debtor had taken on substantial debt secured by its assets and had
received only new management and the opportunity to borrow more money in return. This
finding was not challenged on appeal. Moody, 971 F.2d at 1065 (citing Moody v. Security Pac.
Business Credit, Inc., 127 B.R. 958 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd, 971 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.
1992).
102. Id. at 1067 (citations omitted).
103. The court found "particularly probative" the debtor's receipt in the liquidation of its
1188 (Vol. 46:1165
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Similarly, in analyzing the unreasonably small capital test, the Court of
Appeals implicitly recognized that the issue is whether the transaction imposed
on creditors an unreasonable risk of failure. The court described the test as
whether the debtor would be able "to generate sufficient profits to sustain
operations."" °4 Under this test, a failure need not occur immediately;
instead, the Court of Appeals seemed to be measuring whether the risk of
failure in the future was so great as to be unreasonable. The court explained:
"Because an inability to generate enough cash flow to sustain operations must
precede an inability to pay obligations as they become due, unreasonably small
capital would seem to encompass financial difficulties short of equitable
[in]solvency. " 5
The court then described a method for evaluating whether the debtor was
left with unreasonably small capital after the LBO. Following the analysis of
the court in Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., °6 the Moody court
evaluated the parties' cash flow projections, including the availability of credit,
to determine whether the projections were based on reasonable assumptions
and whether they showed sufficient cash flow to maintain the business. The
Moody court recognized that "because projections tend to be optimistic, their
reasonableness must be tested by an objective standard anchored in the
company's actual performance.""0 7 In addition, the court suggested that
some cushion for risk must be included, stating that "parties must also account
for difficulties that are likely to arise, including interest rate fluctuations and
general economic downturns, and otherwise incorporate some margin for
error." *0 ' Thus, the court found that it could use the parties' projections,
if they were reasonable, to determine whether the transaction presented an
unreasonable risk of failure or whether it posed a reasonable business risk that
only failed as a result of unanticipated problems. 09
The Moody court found that although the projections used in the LBO
before it "were not entirely on the mark,""' they were not unreasonable.
divisions and subsidiaries of an amount roughly equal to the valuation that the lower court placed
on the debtor's property, plant, and equipment. According to the court, "although these assets
were sold long after the leveraged buyout, the conditions under which they were sold
approximated, and may have been more immediate than, that required by the UFCA's 'present
fair salable value' language." Moody, 971 F.2d at 1069.
104. Id. at 1070.
105. Id. Nevertheless, the court found that the concepts of unreasonably small capital and
equitable insolvency are sufficiently related that it was not error for the lower court to consider
the two issues together. See id. at 1071.
106. 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
107. Moody v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1073 (3d Cir. 1992).
108. Id. (citing James F. Queenan, Jr., The Collapsed Leveraged Buyout and the Trustee in
Bankruptcy, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1(1989)).
109. See at 1074-75.
110. Id. at 1074.
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The projections were generally consistent with the debtor's performance before
the LBO and, in fact, were borne out in part by the debtor's profitable
performance during the first five months after the LBO. Rather than
attributing the debtor's failure to the LBO, the court concluded that the district
court did not err in finding that mismanagement, coupled with substantially
increased competition and an economic recession, led to a "drastic decline in
sales [that] was unforeseeable as of the date of the leveraged buyout.""' In
effect, the court found that the debtor undertook a reasonable business risk that
went bad, rather than an unreasonable risk that was doomed to fail from the
beginning.
Both the Mellon and Moody courts seem to have recognized that
fraudulent transfer law is aimed only at transactions that represent an
unreasonable risk from the perspective of unsecured creditors when the
transaction occurs. By upholding the risky transactions at issue in Mellon and
Moody, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals appeared to acknowledge that
debtors may engage in risks that might adversely affect their creditors as long
as the risk is not unreasonable. After all, both transactions were risky and
both were accepted by the courts. Arguably, the chance of success in each
transaction appeared to be sufficient to suggest that the risk imposed by the
transaction was not unreasonable.
One might argue that in modem arms-length transactions, the parties
would never take unreasonable risks in the absence of some fraud. After all,
those who acquire companies in LBOs often invest at least some of their own
funds.112  They project substantial profits if the transaction succeeds and
understand that they will lose their investment if the transaction fails.
Similarly, lenders part with real value in financing these transactions and face
the risk that they will not be repaid or will at least face substantial delay and
expense if the transaction fails. It seems unlikely that investors or lenders
would knowingly and intentionally place their funds at unreasonable risk. This
suggests that although these transactions may be subjected to fraudulent
transfer analysis if the business ultimately fails, many should pass the
fraudulent transfer test.
Yet the cases suggest that even in the absence of actual fraudulent intent,
sophisticated commercial parties may sometimes induce a debtor to take
unreasonable risk. In some transactions the parties may simply fail adequately
to analyze the transaction and the debtor's financial condition in order to
appreciate the level of risk that they are undertaking. This may result from
111. Id. at 1075.
112. See, e.g., In re Best Products Co., 168 B.R. 35, 41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), appeal
dismissed, No. 91-B-10048 1995 WL 23563 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1995) (finding that $50 million
of equity was infused); In re Revco D.S., Inc., 118 B.R. 468, 469 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990)
(finding that common and preferred stock was issued by the acquiror).
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a failure to use sufficient care in evaluating the transaction. In some cases the
deal may be so far along and have so much invested already that by the time
warning signs appear the parties choose to ignore the warnings and proceed
with the deal."' Other institutional interests also may propel a deal forward
even after it no longer seems well advised." 4
Inadequate analysis was a concern addressed by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in Moody when the court suggested that an analysis of the
sufficiency of the debtor's capital turns largely on the reasonableness of the
projections with which the parties worked and that reasonableness requires
some relation between the projections and the debtor's historical performance.
If the parties essentially ignored reality to project cash flows and profits that
may have looked good but likely were unattainable, then the transaction may
have involved unreasonable risk, failing the fraudulent transfer test. On the
other hand, if the parties evaluated realistically the finances, then it may be
reasonable to assume that factors other than the transaction itself led to the
debtor's subsequent inability to service its debt and that the risk taken was not
unreasonable.
This analysis is reflected in In re O'Day Corp.,"5 in which the court
found that an LBO was a fraudulent transfer. In O'Day the court found, inter
alia, that the acquiror and the lender had essentially ignored the debtor's
declining performance just prior to the LBO, relying instead on overly
optimistic projections developed before the declining performance became
clear.116
As the examiner in In re Revco D. S., Inc., I found evidence of a similar
failure to take account of a debtor's inability to meet targeted performance just
prior to an LBO and reliance on projections developed without attention to this
failure." 7 These types of situations, in which parties, without fraudulent
113. See, e.g., Best, 168 B.R. at 40-41& n.5 (involving concerns expressed during due
diligence phase that assumptions underlying projections might be too favorable; involving
concerns discounted as "'business issues"' with thought that "'new management [would be] able
to implement the business processes to meet these projections'" (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)); Final Report of Examiner Professor Barry L. Zaretsky, In re Revco D.S., Inc., 118
B.R. 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) at 86, 197 (on file with South Carolina Law Review)
[hereinafter Report] (finding no revisions to projections or to terms of LBO deal even after it
became clear that the target's actual preclosing performance was weaker than expected).
114. A party might take additional risks to enter into an area of business in which it had not
previously been active. Sometimes compensation is tied to deals that are closed so that there is
incentive to complete a deal even if, after close analysis, the deal looks less attractive.
Sometimes there may be a desire to not disappoint an important client who wants to see the deal
completed. Other concerns may also lead parties to disregard indications of problems in
completing a transaction.
115. Murphy v. Meritor Says. Bank (In re O'Day Corp.), 126 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1991).
116. See id. at 412.
117. See Report, supra note 87, at 86, 197 (observing that there were no revisions to
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intent, fail to heed warning signs in their zeal to complete the deal, may be
exactly the situations in which fraudulent transfer law can regulate the risk
imposed on creditors by these failures."'
Even when the parties accurately evaluate a transaction, there is incentive
for investors to engage in a transaction that may be unreasonably risky. This
is because the risk-reward ratio faced by LBO investors may be more
favorable than that faced by non-LBO creditors. An equity investor in an LBO
will typically invest few if any of its own assets. That is the nature of
leverage. If the deal fails, the investor loses relatively little. Yet if the deal
succeeds the investor may reap substantial profits. Similarly, an LBO lender
will often receive collateral as well as a high interest rate and substantial fees.
The risk that this senior collateralized lender will not be repaid is relatively
small while the potential profits are large. Thus, these investors may pursue
a transaction even if there is a relatively high risk of failure if the expected
return for them is significantly higher than the cost of investing.
However, from the perspective of non-LBO creditors, the loss upon
failure of the enterprise is likely to be substantial while the potential reward
from success is small. Prior to the LBO these creditors stood to be repaid in
full by a healthy debtor. After the LBO they could receive no more than full
payment but face greater risk of non-payment. If this increased risk, the
probability that the enterprise might fail, is unreasonably high, fraudulent
transfer law may provide some remedy.
b. Corporate Guarantees
An approach to fraudulent transfer law that seeks to distinguish between
reasonably and unreasonably risky transactions can also aid in the analysis of
intercorporate guarantees. Lenders to members of a corporate group often
require credit support, or guarantees, from other members of the group.
projections or to the terms of the LBO deal even after it became clear that the target's actual
preclosing performance was weaker than expected).
118. This analysis does not answer the question of who should ultimately bear the loss caused
by this unreasonably risky transaction. The traditional remedy of fraudulent transfer law is
invalidation of the transaction. With a complex LBO, of course, the eggs cannot be unscrambled
and the parties cannot be put back in the positions they were in just prior to the LBO. Courts
and commentators have reached no consensus on where this loss should fall, and resolution of
this issue is beyond the scope of this article. I would note, however, that there are cases and
commentaries suggesting placement of the loss on (1) the acquiror; (2) the lenders; (3) general
creditors; and (4) some or all of the old shareholders of an acquired company. See White, supra
note 40 at 371-93. Similarly, courts and commentators have reached no consensus on who should
benefit from a fraudulent transfer recovery. For example, should post-LBO lenders, who
presumably can price the new level of risk that they face be entitled to recover? See Id.
Resolution of these remedy issues must await further study.
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Consider, for example, a loan to a parent corporation with four operating
subsidiaries, where the loan is to be used to provide working capital to the
subsidiaries. Often, the parent corporation's only significant asset is the stock
of the subsidiaries, with the real assets existing at the subsidiary level. If the
loan is simply to the parent, the lender will be subordinate to all creditors of
the operating entities because its only security will be the equity in those
entities. Yet, the loan is intended to flow through the parent to the subsidiar-
ies. The lender might reasonably want to be treated on an equal basis with the
creditors of the subsidiaries; in fact, it is more likely that the lender will want
collateral from each of the subsidiaries.
The transaction might be structured so that each subsidiary guarantees the
parent's obligation only to the extent that funds flow to the particular
subsidiary." 9 However, in many corporate groups there will be continual
intragroup transactions and it may be difficult to quantify the exact amount
flowing to each subsidiary. Moreover, members of the corporate group may
benefit from the strengthening of other members."12 Indeed, creditors may
well expect that the corporate group will operate as a family in which
members are responsible for each other. Thus, it is increasingly common for
subsidiaries not only to guarantee their parents' obligations, but also to
guarantee or cross guarantee, the obligations of other subsidiaries.
Typically, the subsidiaries will not be of equal financial strength.
Creditors of a stronger subsidiary may be adversely affected by its cross
guaranty of the obligation of a weaker sibling. If the group ultimately fails,
these creditors undoubtedly will complain that but for the cross guarantees they
could have recovered most or all of their claims. Thus, the creditors will
maintain that they should be able to disregard the guaranty liability as
fraudulent, having been incurred for less than reasonably equivalent value and
perhaps having rendered their debtor financially impaired. Similarly, creditors
will likely object to a subsidiary's guarantee of a parent's obligation unless it
can be shown that the subsidiary received an equivalent benefit from the loan
to the parent. 121
119. For example, the parent might take a note from each subsidiary and a security interest
in each subsidiary's assets to secure advances to that subsidiary and assign the notes and security
interests to the lender. Under that structure, each subsidiary would be liable only for the funds
lent to it. Some lenders have taken so-called "net worth guarantees," under which each
subsidiary guarantees the debt only to the extent of its net worth, so that the subsidiary cannot
be rendered insolvent by the guarantee. See Brad R. Godshall & Robert A. Klyman, Wading
"Upstream" in Leveraged Transactions: Traditional Guarantees v. "Net Worth" Guarantees, 46
Bus. LAW. 391 (1991).
120. See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 647 (3d
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992).
121. There may also be corporate law issues concerning the guarantor's ability to enter into
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An approach to fraudulent transfer law that seeks to determine whether
a transaction was unreasonably risky provides a useful framework for analysis
of these intercorporate guarantees. When the loan at issue is a working capital
loan to a group that historically has operated as a corporate group, upstream
or cross-stream guarantees normally will not be the unexpected, unreasonably
risky type of transaction that is objectionable under fraudulent transfer law.
Creditors of individual subsidiaries should not be surprised to learn that their
debtor also is responsible jointly for some relatively normal business debts of
the other members of the corporate group. This arrangement is common for
a modem corporate group and is valuable for all of the members. All may
find additional credit availability, resources, and synergies as a result of their
group membership, making the risk more reasonable from the perspective of
creditors of each of the subsidiaries." This was the analysis of the Mellon
court, which found that the debtor may have received reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for its guaranty of the debt of members of the corporate
group because the debtor received the potential benefit of synergy with the
group and increased credit availability. 3
Another way to analyze these guarantees is to consider whether they are
a type of obligation that is reasonably expected by creditors, one to which
creditors likely would agree if they were asked when they extended credit to
the debtor. If the guaranty is part of a transaction that is ordinary and
reasonably expectable and that strengthens the corporate group as a whole,
then it should not normally be objectionable from the perspective of credi-
tors. 11 Nevertheless, even though the guaranty transaction may be reason-
ably expectable and should normally be unobjectionable, the transaction may
become unreasonable and objectionable if the financial structure of the
corporate group is such that unreasonable risk is imposed on creditors of
particular members of the group. In terms used by fraudulent transfer law, if
certain corporate group members receive no reasonably equivalent benefit and
the new liability renders them financially impaired, the guaranty may create
the type of unreasonable risk to creditors of those members that is proscribed
122. See Williams, Fallacies, supra note 3.
123. See 945 F.2d at 647. See also Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d
979, 991-92 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that an indirect benefit may constitute reasonably equivalent
value).
124. See, e.g., Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368 (D.N.J. 1984); see also
Williams, Fallacies, supra note 3 at 1426 (asserting that courts have used "presumptions of
adequate value. . . [and] identity of interests and indirect benefits... as tools by which to save
otherwise legitimate transactions from condemnation by fraudulent transfer law."); William H.
Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary
Corporation, 30 CASE W. Ras. L. Rav. 433 (1980); Robert J. Rosenberg, Intercorporate
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by fraudulent transfer law. This might result, for example, if the financial
strength of some subsidiaries was being diverted to prop up other subsidiaries
with seriously troubled finances.
Intragroup guarantees of loans that are not for working capital may be less
expectable and may have to satisfy a higher financial standard to be found to
involve reasonable risk."z When the obligation guaranteed is not a working
capital loan for the group, but is a more unusual transaction, the additional
obligation may not be reasonably expectable by creditors and, therefore, may
require a more careful showing that the guarantor received actual value
reasonably equivalent to the obligation undertaken or that the guarantor was
financially sound after the transaction. Thus, for example, the guaranty of an
LBO loan might properly receive closer scrutiny than an ordinary working
capital loan in determining whether the guaranty involved imposes an
unreasonable risk on the guarantor and its creditors.
Of course, courts have recognized that this analysis must consider the
actual nature of the obligation undertaken by the guarantor in determining the
degree of risk and whether any value it received was reasonably equivalent to
the obligation assumed.' 26 This requires an analysis, as of the time that the
transaction was entered into, of the likelihood that the debt will be repaid by
the principal debtor and the availability of contribution from other members
of the corporate group. The face amount of the debt guaranteed is unlikely,
upon analysis, to be equal to the amount of actual detriment undertaken by the
guarantor. Thus, the amount of value that the guarantor received in exchange
for the guaranty may be considered reasonably equivalent to the liability
undertaken even if the value is less than the face amount of the debt guaran-
teed.
The detriment to the guarantor may nevertheless outweigh the benefit
received by the guarantor. This is particularly evident in, for example, LBO
cases in which there often is little direct or even indirect value to the target,
which guarantees the LBO debt. In such cases, the financial impairment prong
of the fraudulent transfer test must be analyzed to determine whether the target
has been put at unreasonable risk by the transaction. The question is whether
the new debt guaranty obligation imposed on the corporate group member
creates a risk of failure that is unreasonable from the perspective of other
creditors.
To analyze the risk issue, courts have, as with the equivalent value issue,
recognized that they must consider the actual effect of the guaranty liability on
the particular corporate group member. After considering the likelihood that
125. Cf. Moody v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d Cir. 1992)
(suggesting higher scrutiny for LBO transactions because of potential for abuse and risks
involved).
126. Mellon, 945 F.2d at 646-48.
1995] 1195
31
Zaretsky: Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the principal debtor, as opposed to the guarantor, might pay the debt and the
possibility of contribution from coguarantors if the guarantor failed to pay, a
court might find that the predicted ultimate liability is less than the face
amount of the debt. This might support a finding that the debtor-guarantor
was not financially impaired after the transaction or that the transaction was
risky but not unreasonably risky to creditors of the guarantor. Alternatively,
this analysis might result in a finding that the guaranty did financially impair
the guarantor, in which case fraudulent transfer law would suggest that the
transaction, unexpected by creditors and unreasonably risky to them, should
be avoidable.
One factor in determining whether the guarantor received reasonably
equivalent value is the economic viability of the corporate group. If no viable
enterprise exists, so that the ultimate effect of the guaranty is simply to shift
assets from creditors of the guarantor to creditors of the principal debtor, then
it will be difficult to find that the guarantor received value in exchange for
undertaking an obligation and, perhaps, transferring property to secure that
obligation. This was essentially the analysis in General Elec. Credit Corp. v.
Murphy (In re Rodriquez).I27 In Rodriquez, the parent paid the debt of the
subsidiary, although it had not guaranteed it. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found that where the parent was insolvent and the subsidiary was
hopelessly insolvent, the parent received no reasonably equivalent value for the
payment. 28 Similarly, in Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Achtenberg'29 the
Missouri District Court held that an insolvent shareholder did not receive
reasonably equivalent value for a guaranty of corporate debt when the
corporation was insolvent at the time of the guaranty.' 30
The thrust of this analysis is that normally a parent corporation receives
value from the guaranty of a subsidiary's debt because the funds borrowed by
the subsidiary increase the value of the parent's equity interest in the
subsidiary. If the subsidiary is insolvent, the additional funds cannot add to
the parent's equity interest an amount equal to the obligation assumed by the
parent because the funds borrowed by the subsidiary must first be applied to
satisfy the claims of creditors of the subsidiary before the parent-equity holder
127. 895 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1990).
128. See id. at 727-28.
129. No. 90-0950-CV-W-6, 1993 WL 476510 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 1993); see also Murphy
v. Avianca, Inc. (In re Duque Rodriguez), 77 B.R. 937 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987).
130. See Commerce, 1993 WL at *4. Of course, mere insolvency of the principal debtor may
not, by itself, require a finding that the guarantor did not receive value. The loan might have
been intended to create viable corporate opportunities that, if successful, would enable the
subsidiary to pay its debts and return a profit to its parent. Thus, the question more properly is
whether the subsidiary's condition is such that further investment in the subsidiary represents an
unreasonable risk from the perspective of the parent. Insolvency may be an indication of such
risk but it need not be conclusive.
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can receive any benefit. In a recent article, Professor Jack Williams suggested
that if the subsidiary was not commercially viable, then the parent would not
effectively receive any value for its guaranty. Rather, the parent would
become liable for an obligation of its subsidiary and, because the subsidiary
was not viable, would receive no increase in the value of its ownership interest
in the subsidiary. He added, "This is no less the case where such a contract
may constitute an honest attempt to revive the troubled subsidiary's prospects
for survival."'
This is correct, but only as far as it goes. That is, if the investment is
obviously a loser from the start, the guaranty represents an unreasonable risk
because there is little or no potential benefit for the parent in assuming the
guaranty liability. Alternatively, if the investment had some reasonable
prospect of success, then the parent might still have received value in the form
of the opportunity to make the investment and take the risk in the first place
even if the venture later failed without ultimate benefit to the parent. This
might be so even if the subsidiary was insolvent, if the subsidiary was an
appropriate vehicle for making the investment. 1 2 Thus, the question is not
solely whether the subsidiary was solvent or whether the venture succeeded,
but whether the risk that the enterprise took was reasonable enough to be
viewed as adding value at the time it was originally commenced.
This analysis is reflected in Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Whyte (In re
Fairchild Aircraft Corp.).' In that case the debtor, Fairchild, manufactured
and sold commuter aircraft. Fairchild identified a potential customer, Air
Kentucky, which flew under a code sharing agreement with USAir. Fairchild
believed that it could sell a substantial number of aircraft to Air Kentucky at
a substantial profit, but only if it could resolve Air Kentucky's financial
difficulties. Fairchild's owner, Metro, also owned one-third of the stock of
Air Kentucky's parent corporation, MPM. As part of the rescue operation,
Metro's owner, GMFI, purchased the remaining two-thirds of the MPM stock.
Thus, Fairchild and Air Kentucky were affiliated entities, albeit indirectly,
with GMFI as the ultimate parent.'34
Unfortunately, USAir objected to GMFI's ownership of both an aircraft
manufacturer and a USAir affiliated commuter airline. Consequently, it gave
notice of its intention to end the code-sharing arrangement with Air Kentucky,
which would effectively destroy Air Kentucky. At about the same time, Air
Kentucky's fuel suppliers refused to supply fuel on credit any further.
Without fuel, Air Kentucky could not fly. If its planes were grounded, there
131. Williams, Fallacies, supra note 3, at 1431.
132. For example, the subsidiary might be the appropriate vehicle because of its existing
business or experience. Synergies between the parent and the subsidiary might create value for
the parent even if its equity interest in the subsidiary had no direct economic value.
133. 6 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1993).
134. Id. at 1123-24.
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was little doubt that Air Kentucky would fail, destroying Fairchild's opportuni-
ty to sell aircraft to Air Kentucky. Moreover, USAir likely would have
blamed Fairchild and its parent for the failure and would be unlikely to buy
aircraft from Fairchild in the future." 5
To keep Air Kentucky flying, Fairchild agreed to pay for fuel delivered
to Air Kentucky. In the meantime, GMFI unsuccessfully sought a buyer for
Air Kentucky. Ultimately, Air Kentucky failed, and nine months later
Fairchild commenced its own Chapter 11 case. The unsecured creditors'
representative in the Fairchild bankruptcy sought to recover from the fuel
supplier payments made by Fairchild for the benefit of Air Kentucky,
contending that the payments were fraudulent transfers. 
3 6
The representative argued that because Air Kentucky failed, Fairchild
received no reasonably equivalent value for the payments and, because it was
financially impaired when the payments were made, the payments were
recoverable as fraudulent transfers. 37 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed, holding that at least with respect to payments made before the
demise of Air Kentucky, Fairchild received reasonably equivalent value. The
Court of Appeals acknowledged that ultimately Fairchild received nothing as
a result of its investment in Air Kentucky, but that did not mean that it
received no value in exchange for the payments. The court emphasized that
the value of the payments must be evaluated as of the time each payment was
made, without the benefit of hindsight. 3 ' Thus, according to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the question was "whether keeping Air Kentucky
operating during this period was worth $16,000-$20,000 a week, or its
'reasonable equivalent,' to Fairchild. ""' The court found several benefits
for Fairchild, including the maintenance of good relations with USAir, a
potential customer, and the continued marketability of Air Kentucky, sale of
which might result in a continuing customer relationship as well as an
opportunity to recoup some of the substantial investment Fairchild already had
made in Air Kentucky."4
The Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the representative's argument that
the value of Fairchild's investment must be measured by the actual payoff on
the investment. Instead, the court essentially adopted an approach that
recognized the validity of Fairchild's paying to play.' In effect, as long
as Fairchild's decision to invest in Air Kentucky was not unreasonably risky
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1124.
137. Id. at 1124-25.
138. See Fairchild, 6 F.3d at 1127.
139. Id. at 1126.
140. See id. at 1126-27.
141. See id. at 1126-27.
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or certainly doomed to fail, the court was willing to recognize the value of the
investment opportunity.
Interestingly, the court distinguished between payments Fairchild made
before Air Kentucky ceased operations and payments made after the cessation
of operations. 42 The Court of Appeals found that Fairchild had no legal
obligation to pay for fuel delivered to Air Kentucky; therefore, payments could
be for reasonably equivalent value only if Fairchild received some benefit
other than release of an antecedent obligation.' 43 While Air Kentucky was
flying, the benefit to Fairchild was the continuation of Air Kentucky's
operations with the attendant possibility of marketing Air Kentucky and of
maintaining good relations with USAir. " Once Air Kentucky ceased
operations, however, there was no further benefit to Fairchild in paying for
fuel that had been delivered to Air Kentucky. After cessation of operations,
there was virtually no hope that Fairchild could gain from its continued
payments. Those payments were almost in the nature of a gift and because
Fairchild's financial condition was impaired, were recoverable as fraudulent
transfers. '4 5
Although Fairchild did not concern directly an intercorporate guaran-
ty, 146 the principle of recognizing the value of corporate opportunities should
apply to guaranty cases as well. That value, however, exists only when there
is some reasonable chance that the risk or investment undertaken could yield
a meaningful return. Again, a debtor may take reasonable risks with its
creditors' funds, but fraudulent transfer law proscribes the taking of unreason-
able risks.
PART IV
LIMITATIONS OF UNREASONABLE RISK ANALYSIS
Recognition that fraudulent transfer law is intended to regulate unreason-
able risk but to permit reasonable risk-taking by debtors ameliorates some of
the problems with applying fraudulent transfer law to modern transactions.
However, this does not eliminate all problems created by this body of law.
142. See at 1127.
143. See Fairchild, 6 F.3d at 1127-28.
144. The court did not seem to be concerned with whether Air Kentucky was insolvent at the
time Fairchild paid for the fuel. Instead, the court seemed to view this as a question of corporate
opportunity; if there was reasonable potential for gain, then the investment was worth making,
even if with the benefit of hindsight we know that it failed. See id. at 1127.
145. Id. at 1129.
146. The fuel supplier had argued that Fairchild had guaranteed Air Kentucky's obligation, but
the court found the oral guaranty was unenforceable. See id. at 1128-29. Consequently, although
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In particular, the application of fraudulent transfer law to relatively normal
business transactions may increase the cost or inhibit the completion of some
of those transactions by forcing a lender to increase its price for a loan to
account for the increased risk imposed by fraudulent transfer law. For
example, a lender to an LBO or to a corporate group offering upstream and
cross-stream guarantees must engage in extra due diligence in order to be
ready to prove that the transaction met the financial and reasonably equivalent
value standards of the constructive fraud provisions. However, no amount of
due diligence will assure the lender that its liens or guarantees will be
enforceable in the event that the LBO target, or a member of the corporate
group, fails. Moreover, the debtor and its other creditors cannot offer
absolute protection from fraudulent transfer law even if they purport to waive
its benefits. 47  Consequently, otherwise beneficial transactions may be
deterred because of the increased risk imposed by fraudulent transfer law.
The risk of fraudulent transfer avoidance is particularly difficult for
parties to quantify because fraudulent transfer law permits an after-the-fact re-
evaluation of the value given and of the debtor's financial standing, both of
which may be colored by hindsight. 4 ' Of course, a transaction may also be
subject to after-the-fact determinations of good faith, unconscionability,
reasonableness, and other nonquantifiable factors. Nevertheless, to say that
fraudulent transfer law is not the only risk factor does not diminish the need
for critical analysis of whether the costs imposed by fraudulent transfer law's
regulation are worth the benefits.
Even if some level of regulation seems appropriate, it will be necessary
to analyze whether the constructive fraud standards are the optimal measure
of unreasonable risk. 49  Moreover, more careful analysis is needed to
determine whether fraudulent transfer costs are imposed on the correct parties
and whether the remedies provided by fraudulent transfer law effectively
implement its policies. 50 At this point, it may be of some value simply to
recognize why fraudulent transfer law considers some transactions "unfair"
and authorizes attacks on them. Further analysis might suggest that other
limitations on the reach of fraudulent transfer law are necessary to encourage
efficient application of this body of law or that remedies must be adjusted to
147. There is always the risk that there will be one remaining creditor who might offer a basis
for avoiding the entire transaction. See Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931); see also 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 548 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
148. Courts have, however, at least paid lip service to the need to evaluate the transaction as
of the time it was entered into rather than with the benefit of hindsight. See, e.g., Moody v.
Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1992).
149. In this regard, further analysis of the effect of different types or risks, and in particular
of any need to regulate transactions with widely dispersed outcomes, is also needed. See note
36 supra.
150. See David G. Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts, supra note 3; White, supra note 40.
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address inefficiencies created by fraudulent transfer law.
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